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Appellant,
v.
Estate of JERRY L. RICE and
JOHN DOES I through V,
Appellee.

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT

Appellant

JoAnna

Mitchell,

individually

and

Joanna

Mitchell, personal representative of the estate of Jerry Mitchell,
deceased,

respectfully

submits her

reply

brief

in the

appeal

proceedings.
ARGUMENT
I.

SUMMARY JUDGMENT WAS NOT PROPER BECAUSE RICE WAS AN INDEPENDENT
CONTRACTOR OF MITCHELL.
The parties agree on the appropriate legal standard by

which to assess Rice's relationship with Mitchell.

Nevertheless,

the application of the undisputed legal standards to this case show
that Rice was not, as a matter of law, an employee of Mitchell.
Utah Code Annotated

Section 35-1-42(2)(b) defines an
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independent contractor as:
any person engaged in the performance of any
work for another who, while so engaged, is
independent of the employer in all that
pertains to the execution of the work, is not
subject to the rule or control of the
employer, is engaged only in the performance
of a definite job or piece of work, and is
subordinate to the employer only in effecting
a result in accordance with the employer's
design.
Rice's relationship with Mitchell falls squarely within
the definition of independent contractor set forth above. Rice was
subordinate to Mitchell "only in effecting a result in accordance
with the employer's design." The appellee attempts to minimize the
independence of Rice by characterizing Rice as a "less than perfect
employee."

(Brief of Appellee, p. 14).

This characterization

misses the point that the reason Rice acted the way he did was
because he was an independent contractor.

The result Rice had to

achieve in his work with Mitchell was the delivery of goods to a
specific location. Any independent contractor would have to comply
with this type of delivery requirement.

This does not make all

truck drivers employees of companies for whom they drive. A more
realistic way of viewing the relationship between Mitchell and Rice
is to assess what degree of discretion that could be exercised, and
then, whether such discretion was in fact exercised.

In fact, a

case cited by appellee recognizes the difficulty of employing the
traditional independent contractor vs. employee test in the context
of truck driving.

"Since the factor of actual control of details,

often relied upon by the courts in resolving this same issue, is
not likely to be helpful here, the importance of other tests, such
as power of termination and method of payment, is magnified."
- 2 -

Matkins v. Zero Refrigerated Lines, Inc.f 602 P.2d 195, 199 (N.M.
Ct. App. 1979). Appellant submits that this Court should focus on
the degree of control exercised by Rice in a context that was not
already predetermined by the nature of the job.

These factors

indicate that where discretion was permissible, Rice exercised an
equal amount of discretion as did Mitchell.
The appellant, Mitchell, established in the proceedings
at the trial court that Rice would engage in runs whenever he felt
like it.

When he would accept a run, he would exercise as much

control or discretion as it was possible for a truck driver to
exercise.

Specifically, Rice would determine where, when and for

how long to stop.

(Appellant's Brief, p. 6) . These facts were not

contested by the appellee and are directly contrary to appellee's
contention that "Mr Rice had no discretion on how to operate the
vehicle."

(Brief of Appellee, p. 17).

The Utah Supreme Court

noted that the fact an employee worked at his convenience was
relevant to the Court's holding that the worker in that case was an
independent contractor and not an employee. English v. Kienke, 848
P.2d

153, 158

(Utah 1993).

Although the Kienke decision is

distinguishable in other respects, the Court did find the worker's
discretion as to when he would work relevant to its finding that
the worker was an independent contractor and not an employee.
The appellee makes an erroneous factual assumption when
he states that when Rice "did drive[,] he was not allowed simply to
take the vehicle and then be paid on his return by Mitchell."
(Appellee's Brief, p. 14) . In contrast, the appellant has cited to
the record in her statement of facts that "Jerry Rice would
- 3 -

sometimes use Jerry Mitchell's truck to perform runs for Logistics
Express by himself."

(Appellant's Brief, p. 6 citing p. 200 of the

record). This is yet another factor compelling the conclusion that
Rice was an independent contractor of Mitchell.
Finally, the appellee contends in his brief that "the
fact that the owner of the vehicle is in the truck shows he has a
right to control the vehicle."

(Brief of Appellee, p. 14).

Although the appellee suggests that this contention finds support
in Kinne v. Industrial Commission, 609 P. 2d 926
appellant can find no such reference.

(Utah 1980)

The accident in Kinne

addressed an accident in which the owner of the vehicle was not
present.

The mere presence or absence of the owner of a vehicle

cannot change the legal relationship of the parties.

Instead,

courts typically look to the underlying facts and circumstances
surrounding the disputed relationship in determining the character
of that relationship.

In the instant case, the weight of the

evidence suggests Rice was an independent contractor of Mitchell.
Judge Glasmann held that the facts as presented to him
permitted only reasonable conclusion under the law; that Rice was
an employee of Mitchell. However, the array of facts before Judge
Glasmann do not lend themselves to only one reasonable conclusion.
This, by itself, precludes summary judgment under Gourdin By and
Through Close v. Scera. 845 P.2d 242 (Utah 1992).

The appellant

therefore asks that this case be remanded for a determination of
the independent contractor issue.
II.

RICE IS NOT ENTITLED TO THE BENEFIT OF THE EXCLUSIVE REMEDY
PROVISION, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED SECTION 35-1-60.
The appellee argues that Rice and Mitchell are statutory
- 4 -

co-employees and, therefore, Rice is immune from suit under Utah
Code Annotated § 35-1-60, the exclusive remedy provision. Even if
this Court characterizes Rice and Mitchell as statutory coemployees, the estate of Jerry Rice is not entitled to the benefits
of the exclusive remedy provision. In Pate v. Marathon Steel Co.,
777 P.2d 428 (Utah 1989) the Utah Supreme Court held that "a worker
can sue a statutory employer who has not been required to pay
workers compensation benefits and that the later does not partake
of the immunity afforded by section 35-1-60."

Bosch v. Busch

Deve1opment, Inc., 777 P.2d 431, 432 (Utah 1989).

Similarly, if a

statutory employer, who remains contingently liable for workers
compensation benefits cannot enjoy the immunity of the exclusive
remedy provision, then a statutory co-employee, who will under no
circumstances be liable for workers compensation benefits, cannot
enjoy the immunity of Utah's exclusive remedy provision.
In addition, the concept of a statutory employer was
created by statute in order to allow a worker to recover workers
compensation benefits from contractors who "retain supervision and
control" over a worker.

Utah Code Annotated Section 35-1-42(2).

The category of statutory employer is entirely a creature of
statute which serves the specific and narrow purpose of providing
an alternative source for an injured worker to receive workers
compensation benefits.
statutory

co-employee.

legislative

There is no corollary classification of a
There

is, therefore, no

discernable

intent that workers who have a common statutory

employer are immune from suit and may take advantage of the
exclusive remedy provision.
- 5 -

The appellee cites Harry L. Young & Sons. Inc. v. Ashton,
538 P.2d 316 (Utah 1975) in support of his contention that Mitchell
was an employee of Logistics Express. In so arguing, the appellee
now seeks to evade the effects of the lease agreement he relied on
in arguing that Rice was an employee of Mitchell.

Specifically,

the lease agreement entered into between Logistics Express and
Mitchell

explicitly

states

that

Mitchell

is

an

independent

contractor of Logistics Express and not an employee.

While this

factor, by itself, is not controlling under Harry L. Young & Sons,
it is relevant to this Court's determination.

In addition,

Mitchell, unlike the driver in Harry L. Young & Sons owned his own
truck and hence furnished his own equipment.

Whether a worker

furnishes his own equipment is relevant in determining whether a
worker is an employee or an independent contractor.

Id. at 318.

Other factors cited by appellee, such as the fact that Mitchell had
a Logex sign on his truck, are of minimal legal significance and
cannot change the relationship between Mitchell and Logistics
Express.
Furthermore, Harry L. Young & Sons does not support the
view that Rice was an employee

of Logistics

Express.

The

documentary evidence appellee relies upon explicitly states Rice is
not an employee of Logistics Express.

(Appellees Brief, p. 16).

As little control as Mitchell had over Rice, Logistics Express had
even

less control

over Rice.

This

fact alone

compels the

conclusion that Rice was not an employee of Logistics Express.
The appellee cites three out-of-state cases which are
distinguishable; Schell v. Navaio Freight Lines, Inc., 693 P. 2d 382
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(Colo. App. 1984); Wilson v. Riley Whittle, Inc.. 701 P.2d 575 (Az.
Ct. App. 1984) and Matkins v. Zero Refrigerated Lines, Inc., 602
P.2d 195 (N.M. Ct. App. 1979).
The first two cases, Schell and Wilson, both hold that a
trucking company with an ICC permit may not hire independent
contractor drivers and thereby evade tort liability to injured
members of the public under 49 U.S.C. §11107.

The Schell court

explained that:
The statute, which was enacted to prevent
authorized interstate carriers from immunizing
themselves from liability to the public, by
leasing trucks from irresponsible third
parties . . . Ici. at 384.
Pursuant

to

this

concern

for the

public

"the ICC

promulgated a regulatory scheme to effectuate Congress' intent to
render carriers primarily liable to the public."

Id.

The effect

of the ICC regulations is to hold companies such as Logex liable to
members of the public for harm done by irresponsible truckers. The
ICC regulations therefore eliminated the defense commonly raised by
such trucking companies as Logex that it was immune from suit for
the tortious acts of its drivers because those drivers were
independent contractors. This defense was eliminated in a specific
context; suits by injured members of the travelling public against
truck companies.
For example, the Schell case involved an injured member
of the public and the negligence of a trucker operating under an
ICC permit.

In this context, the court found the trucker an

employee of the trucking company.
Similarly in Wilson, another member of the public was
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injured when a truck driver negligently collided with another truck
driver on a public road.

Once again, in this context, the court

would not hear the defense of the trucking company that the trucker
was an independent contractor. For purposes of harm to the general
public, the holder of the ICC permit was liable.

The court noted

that "[t]he federal statute and the federal regulations promulgated
thereunder protect the motoring public by requiring the trucking
company to have control of and to be responsible for the operation
of the leased vehicles."

Id. at 579.

Further, the court noted

that 49 U.S.C. § 11107 was enacted to "ensure that the motoring
public was adequately protected."

Id. at 578-79.

Jerry Mitchell was not a member of the public and hence
was not protected under the ICC regulations upon which the appellee
relies.

The trial court in the proceedings below came to this

conclusion and dismissed Mitchell's suit against Logistics Express.
Therefore the ICC regulations cited by appellee and case law
interpreting these regulations are not relevant

in assessing

whether under state workers compensation law the exclusive remedy
provision bars a negligence suit against a co-driver. Mitchell was
a fellow driver, and not a member of the travelling public.
Therefore, the Schell and Wilson cases do not (1) make Mitchell and
Rice employees of Logex under Utah's Workers Compensation Act; and
(2) do not make Mitchell and Rice statutory co-employees under
Utah's Workers Compensation Act.
Finally, in Matkins. two drivers worked for a trucking
company who in turn, leased the truckers to a trucking company with
a proper ICC permit.

This case would be similar if Mitchell and
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Rice had driven a truck of another company who in turn leased
Mitchell and Rice out to Logex. Mitchell and Rice would clearly be
employees in that context.

However, the facts of this case are

different. Mitchell owned his own vehicle. Rice worked with Logex
through Mitchell. The company that was found to be the employer in
Matkins "agreed to furnish a truck and two drivers" to the licensed
ICC company.

Id. at 196.

In the instant case, no such company

exists, and in the absence of such a company it cannot be said that
Mitchell and Rice were employees of Logex.
CONCLUSION
Summary judgment in this instance was improper because
the evidence presented creates a material issue of fact as to
whether Rice was an independent contractor of Mitchell or whether
he was an employee.

In addition, Mitchell and Rice were not co-

employees of Logex, either at common law or by statute.

Further,

even if they are characterized as statutory co-employees, such coemployees are not entitled to the immunity provided under the
exclusive remedy provision found in U.C.A. § 35-1-60.
DATED this
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day of
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